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SU M M A R Y
This report discusses some findings of a study deal­
ing with the bargaining power of grade A milk co­
operatives. These findings may be useful to members 
and boards of directors of dairy bargaining coopera­
tives and should contribute to a better understanding 
of bargaining power and factors affecting bargaining 
power. Also, these findings may help in assessing the 
consequences of cooperative bargaining activities and 
may suggest ways in which members and boards of 
directors can work toward improving their bargaining 
effectiveness.
Managers of 10 different grade A milk bargaining 
cooperatives located in the North Central Region were 
interviewed. The main things studied were: (a) fac­
tors influencing dairy cooperatives’ bargaining power,
(b) the objectives of dairy bargaining cooperatives and
(c) ways dairy bargaining cooperatives try to achieve 
their objectives.
Several factors influence the bargaining power of 
dairy cooperatives. These include governmental regu­
lations pertaining to cooperatives and milk distribu­
tion, characteristics of local markets, volume of milk 
marketed by the cooperative, bargaining activities of 
nearby cooperatives in dealing with milk distributors, 
alternative sources of milk for grade A milk handlers, 
alternative outlets for members’ milk, growth in size of 
milk bottlers and mergers among bottiers, size of proc­
essing facilities owned by the cooperative, and extent 
to which cooperatives work together in adopting mutual­
ly beneficial policies.
Grade A dairy bargaining cooperatives provide a 
number of services for members, in addition to bar­
gaining over the price of milk. They also provide serv­
ices to milk bottlers. And in return for these services, 
the cooperatives obtain a higher price for their mem­
bers’ milk.
Dairy bargaining cooperatives have several different 
objectives. Maintaining a market for members’ milk, 
obtaining high milk prices for members and maintaining 
Class I sales volume are generally considered the most 
important objectives. There is variation among coopera­
tives in the relative importance of various objectives. 
This variation is due, in part, to differences in the char­
acteristics of individual cooperatives and of their 
markets.
Producers supplying milk to the Chicago and Detroit 
markets receive large premiums over federal-order prices 
— much larger premiums than producers in other mar­
kets studied receive. Our findings help to explain the 
existence of these premiums. Although Chicago and 
Detroit bottlers need their local cooperatives’ milk, 
bottlers in other markets studied do not. For the other 
markets studied, there is more than enough surplus 
grade A milk available from alternative sources to re­
place the milk of the local cooperative if it withheld 
milk. But Chicago and Detroit are such big markets 
that bottlers there would find it virtually impossible to 
satisfy their current levels of consumption from alterna­
tive sources.
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Factors Affecting The Bargaining Power of Some 
Dairy Bargaining Cooperatives1
by George W. Ladd and Milton C. Hallberg
Individual farmers are unable to influence the prices 
they receive for their products, but the firms to which 
farmers sell their products are frequently price-setters. 
Consequently, there is widespread belief that the 
farmers’ weak market-power position is a chief cause 
of their farm marketing and income problems. Re­
flecting this belief is an increasing interest in farmers’ 
bargaining power as a means to improve their income.
Various national farm organizations have taken an 
interest in increasing farmers’ bargaining power through 
collective action. And several individual farm commodity 
groups have also tried to increase farmers’ bargaining 
power—most notably in the milk, fruit and vegetable 
industries— through the development and operation of 
bargaining cooperatives (see table 1).
One of the most important of this type of coopera­
tive is the dairy bargaining cooperative. A  1957 survey 
by the Farmer Cooperative Service of the United States 
Department of Agriculture indicated that about 207 
associations bargained over the price of 1.3 billion 
dollars worth of milk.2 A  major objective of these or­
ganizations is to increase prices received by members. 
They attempt to bargain for a price higher than the 
price the farmers would have obtained without the 
organization. Thus, cooperative bargaining associations 
are considered a partial solution to the complex farm 
problem. This study is concerned specifically with dairy 
bargaining cooperatives.
Our purpose was to determine factors influencing 
bargaining power of grade A milk bargaining coopera­
tives, to study objectives of such organizations, and to 
investigate various means at the cooperatives’ disposal 
for achieving their objectives and the extent to which 
these means are used in bargaining with fluid milk 
distributors. This study did not deal with the legal is­
sues relating to cooperative behavior.3
This report may provide members and boards of 
directors of dairy bargaining cooperatives with a better 
understanding-of bargaining power and help them im-
1 Project 1635 o f the Iowa Agriculture and Home 'Economics Experiment 
Station. This bulletin is a contribution from the Iowa Agriculture 
and Home Economics Experiment Station as a collaborator under North 
Central Regional Cooperative Research Project NCM-38 “ Dairy Market 
Adjustment Problems in the North Central Region.”  The authors are 
grateful to the cooperative managers who supplied information for 
this study.
2 Wendell M . McMillen. Data from cooperative study. (Private com­
munication.) 1963.
3 Cooperative legislation and the application o f antitrust laws to _ co­
operatives are discussed in: Joseph J. Saunders. The status o f agricul­
tural cooperatives under the antitrust laws. Federal Bar Jour. 20:35-55. 
1960; Neil Brooks, Robert L. Clodius and Edwin G. Nourse. Lessons 
for farm economists from recent antitrust decisions. Jour. Farm Econ. 
44:1589-1626. 1962; Stuart H. Russell. Application of antitrust laws to 
agricultural cooperatives, pp. 18-27; Proceedings o f the 18th Annual 
Midwest Milk Marketing Conference. Iowa State University. 1963. (Copies 
of the proceedings are available from Sheldon W . Williams, Mumford 
Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801.)
prove the bargaining effectiveness of their cooperatives.
B A R G A IN IN G  POW ER
Tw o things are basic to a bargaining relationship: 
(a) a conflict of interest between the parties involved 
and (b) an attempt by each party to resolve the con­
flict as favorably as possible to himself. Almost every 
bargaining relationship also involves a community of 
interest. For example, grade A milk producers and 
bottlers want to sell large volumes of fluid milk products 
to consumers at satisfactory prices.
Bargaining may be viewed simply as the simultaneous 
effort by each party to win the consent of the others. 
That is, each party is trying to resolve the conflict and 
to convince the others that it should be resolved in his 
favor.
The outcome of the bargaining process depends on 
whether or not one or both parties will make some 
concession from their preferred position. The degree 
of influence one party has over another to force such 
concessions, or the ability to effect agreements on one’s 
own terms, is referred to as bargaining power. One’s 
bargaining power will be greater the more favorable 
he can make it for his opponent to accept his offer 
or the more unfavorable he can make it for his op­
ponent to refuse to accept or to bargain further.
There are two different types of bargaining power. 
The first—type I power— stems from advantages that 
can be offered to die opponent in return for accepting 
one’s terms. Such advantages may be savings that can 
be offered the opponent or extra services than can be 
provided.
The second kind of bargaining power— type II 
power— is the bargainer’s ability to enforce unfavorable 
consequences upon his opponent if this opponent refuses 
to accept the stated terms. T o  exercise this type of bar-
Table I. Estimated number of bargaining cooperatives in the 
United States, 1962.
Type of cooperative Number Percentage of total
Dairy* .......................... ........ 207 59.5
Fruit and vegetable11........ ........ 63 18.1
Sugar beetsb ................. ........ 47 13.5
Eggb ............................. ........ 30 8.6
Pulpwoodb ...................... ........ 1 0.3
Total ................. . .........  348 i 00.00
“Source: Wendell M. McMillen, Assistant Director, Marketing 
Division, U. S. Dept. Agr. Data from cooperative study. (Private 
communication.) August 1963.
b Source: J. Kenneth Samuels. Bargaining activities in other com­
modities. Fruit and Vegetable Bargaining Cooperatives Conf. Proc. 
5:49-53. 196!.
gaining power, the bargainer must be able to subject 
the opponent to some added costs or losses for refusing 
to accept terms. The higher the costs or the larger the 
losses that can be imposed on an opponent, the greater 
is one’s bargaining power. These two types may be used 
together by a bargainer.
The outcome of the bargaining process depends on 
the power of the individuals involved and on the strategy 
used during the bargaining process. In addition, the final 
outcome may affect one’s bargaining power.4
FLUID M ILK M ARKETING  SYSTEM
In discussions of milk marketing, certain common 
words have specific meanings. These terms and the 
fluid milk marketing system will be briefly discussed.
The term fluid milk includes such products as bot­
tled or cartoned milk or cream, flavored milk drinks, 
half and half, etc. A firm that receives farm-produced 
milk and produces fluid milk products is a bottler or 
handler; its plant is a bottling plant. Butter, nonfat 
dry milk, ice cream, cheese, etc., are referred to as 
processed dairy products. A  plant in which processed 
dairy products are produced is a processing plant.
Virtually all milk consumed as fluid milk in this 
country is grade A milk. T o  qualify as a grade A milk 
producer, or simply as a producer, a farmer must meet 
certain standards of sanitation and equipment on his 
farm. These sanitary regulations are prescribed and 
enforced by local or state health authorities. These 
authorities may charge each producer an inspection 
fee. Local or state health authorities require that milk 
used in fluid milk products be grade A milk. Normally, 
processed dairy products need not be made from grade 
A milk, although some local health authorities require 
certain processed products to be made from grade A 
milk.
Milk that is not grade A milk is referred to as 
manufacturing grade milk.
This study dealt with grade A milk bargaining 
cooperatives: bargaining cooperatives whose members 
are grade A milk producers. They will be referred to 
as bargaining cooperatives or simply as cooperatives.
About 60 percent of the nonfarm population of 
the United States lives in market areas where federal 
milk marketing orders are in effect. There are 76 such 
orders. Federal milk marketing orders are authorized 
by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 
(as amended). The declared purpose is to “ establish 
and maintain such orderly marketing conditions . . . 
as will establish (prices that) are reasonable in view 
of the price of feeds, the available supplies of feeds 
and other economic conditions; (that will) insure a 
sufficient quantity of pure and wholesome milk; and be 
in the public interest.”
* More complete discussions of the definition of bargaining power, the 
factors that affect an organization’ s bargaining power and the determi­
nants o f the outcome o f negotiations are presented in: George W. Ladd. 
Agricultural bargaining power. Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 
19S4.
Each order regulates a part of the operations of 
grade A milk bottlers who sell all or a substantial part 
of their fluid milk products in an area defined by the 
order. The market area defined by the order is an area in 
which handlers subject to the provisions of the order 
compete with each other in the sale of fluid milk 
products.
Each order has an administrator and administrator’s 
staff. Each order provides the formulas the order ad­
ministrator uses to compute the minimum prices a 
handler must pay for milk used in various products, 
provides a formula by which the minimum price to 
each producer is determined, requires each handler 
to supply the administrator reports on receipts of milk 
and on quantities used in various products, and pro­
vides auditing procedures to verify each handler’s 
reports.
Most orders classify dairy products and milk into 
two classes. Fluid milk products are included in Class 
I, and milk used in these products is Class I milk. 
Class I products are those products the health authori­
ties require to be made from grade A milk. All other 
products are Class II products; milk used in them is 
Class II milk.
In most federal order markets and in all markets 
in the North Central Region, the order prices for Class 
II milk (i.e., the minimum prices dealers must pay 
for Class II milk) are closely related to the farm price 
of manufacturing grade milk and to prices of processed 
dairy products. The order formulas provide that dealers 
pay a higher price for Class I milk than for Class II 
milk.
The order blend price (the minimum price to each 
producer, which is computed by a formula specified 
in the order) is a weighted average of the dealer prices 
for Class I and Class II milk, adjusted for the butter- 
fat content of the farmer’s milk and his distance from 
market. Before computing the blend price, deductions 
are made to pay cooperatives for services rendered mem­
bers and to pay the expenses of the order administra­
tor’s office. As the proportion of grade A milk in a 
market that is used in Class I products (the Class I 
utilization ratio) rises the blend price rises. As this 
utilization ratio falls the blend price falls.
Some federal orders contain a supply-demand ad­
juster provision. Under this provision the current Class 
I utilization ratio is compared with an average or 
normal Class I utilization ratio. If the current ratio is 
above normal, the minimum order price for Class I 
milk is adjusted upward, raising the blend price. If 
the current ratio is below normal, the minimum order 
price for Class I milk is adjusted downward, lowering 
the blend price.5
All prices computed by the formulas in the orders 
are minimum prices. In many markets, bargaining co-
® The operation of federal milk marketing orders is discussed in detail 
in: U.S. Agricultural Marketing Service. The federal milk marketing 
order program. U.S. Dept. Agr. Mktg. Bui. 27. 1963.
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!operatives have successfully bargained for higher Class 
I or Class II prices, resulting in higher blend prices for 
members. The difference between a negotiated price 
and an order price is referred to as a premium.
In most federal order markets, the producers sup­
plying the market produce substantially more grade A 
milk than is required for Class I products. That is, more 
grade A milk is available than is used in those products 
that must be made from grade A milk. A market gen­
erally does need to receive somewhat more grade A milk 
than is actually used in Class I products. This extra 
milk is needed to meet (a) day-to-day fluctuations in 
volume of milk received by individual handlers, (b) 
seasonal fluctuations in milk production and (c) day-to- 
day and seasonal fluctuations in sales of Class I prod­
ucts. This grade A milk, which is required but is 
not used in Class I products, is referred to as operating 
reserve; the operating reserve runs about 15 percent of 
actual Class I use in most markets. Grade A milk pro­
duction over and above the amount required for Class 
I products and necessary reserve is surplus. Most sur­
plus goes to nearby processing plants for processing 
into Class II products; some is shipped to distant mar­
kets and used in Class I products in those markets. Bar­
gaining cooperatives would ship more of their surplus 
to distant markets for Class I usage if they had the 
opportunity since Class I prices exceed Class II prices.
CHARACTERISTICS A N D  MARKET ENVIRONM ENT  
OF COOPERATIVES STUDIED
Managers of 10 bargaining cooperatives were inter­
viewed in mid-1964. Information was collected on their 
1963 operations. The cooperatives studied and their 
membership and volume are listed in table 2.
Estimated membership as a percentage of total num­
ber of grade A milk producers and cooperative volume 
as a percentage of the estimated volume in the coopera­
tive’s procurement area (the area in which cooperative 
members are located) vary considerably. This is because 
of variations in the volume of milk production of inde­
pendent producers who do not belong to a cooperative 
and variations in the amount of overlapping in the 
procurement areas. For example, there is considerable 
overlapping of procurement areas in eastern Iowa but 
practically no overlapping in western Iowa.
External Factors Affecting the Cooperative's 
Bargaining Ability
Federal orders
Federal orders may be a substitute for a coopera­
tive’s bargaining power. A cooperative that is unable, 
to negotiate and enforce a classified price plan with 
dealers can still operate under such a plan if located 
in a federal-order market.
Some producers object to joining bargaining co­
operatives because of the deductions made to pay for 
cooperative services to members. Under a federal order, 
all producers are subject to deductions used to pay the 
market administrator or the cooperative for weighing, 
testing and sampling milk and providing market infor­
mation. Since he pays for these services whether he is 
a member or not, a producer under a federal order 
may be less reluctant to join a bargaining cooperative. 
Thus, a federal order may increase cooperative mem­
bership.
Market changes
The cooperative managers interviewed listed several 
characteristics of their markets that they believed had 
an influence on the bargaining ability of their coopera­
tives. As indicated in table 3, growth in size of handlers 
and mergers of handlers were believed to have affected 
the bargaining ability of eight cooperatives. Managers
Table 2. Membership and volume of cooperatives studied, 1963.
Cooperatives
Membershi
Total
P
Percentage 
of total 
producers 
in area“
Volume of grade A  milk 
as a percentage of 
total in the area4
Burlington Cooperative Milk Producers Association, Burlington, Iowa ........... 14 16 25
Cedar Valley Cooperative Milk Association, Waterloo, Io w a ....................... 320 54 54
Des Moines Cooperative Milk Marketing Association, Des Moines, lowab . . . . 912 70 70
Eastern Iowa Cooperative Dairy Producers Association, Cedar Rapids, lowab 430 55 55
Mississippi Valley Milk Producers Association, Moline, Illinois .................... 540 50 50
Nebraska-lowa Non-Stock Cooperative Milk Association, Omaha, Nebraska . . 1,489 97 95
North Iowa Cooperative Milk Marketing Association, Mason City, Iowa .... 62 51 60
Sioux City Milk Producers' Cooperative Association, Sioux City, Iowa ........ 168 100 100
Pure Milk Association, Chicago, Illinois .................................................. 12,000 40 40
Michigan Milk Producers Association Detroit, Michigan ............................ 11,917 79 57
The area referred to here is the cooperative's procurement area, which is the area in which the cooperative's members are located. The 
Percentages are estimates provided by the respective cooperative managers. The exact numbers of grade A  producers and volumes of 
grade A  milk in these areas are unknown at present.
These two cooperatives have recently merged, but were in existence as individual cooperatives during 1963.
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Table 3. Number of cooperative managers indicating that their 
bargaining ability was affected by various structural 
changes in the dairy industry.
Number of
Structural change cooperatives
Growth in size of handlers and handler mergers............  8
Large-quantity buying by a single retail u n it .................  6
Competition from handlers in other markets
due to different federal-order prices ..........................  9
Competition from handlers in other markets
due to a desire to expand total market area .................. 9
believed that the ability of larger firms to survive at 
lower prices and to initiate price wars has a major im­
pact on cooperatives’ bargaining ability. Also, the de­
sire and ability of larger handlers to sign up their own 
independent producers were considered hindrances to 
the cooperatives’ bargaining ability.
One cooperative had worked out an agreement with 
local handlers whereby the cooperative would take as 
members farmers supplying milk to any bottling plant 
being acquired by a local handler (whether the bottling 
plant being acquired was located within or beyond the 
cooperative’s procurement area).
Large-quantity buying by a single retail unit also 
affects a cooperative’s bargaining power. The size of 
some retail accounts has grown so large in recent years 
that the handler cannot afford to lose these accounts. 
Such accounts may be national grocery chains or de­
fense or school lunch contracts. The handler will typi­
cally contract with these outlets for a delivery date and 
price in advance of negotiations with the cooperative. 
The handler is then certain o f the price he will get for 
his bottled milk and can use this as an argument for 
either paying no premium to the cooperative or for 
refusing to pay a higher premium. Three of the four 
managers indicating that this market characteristic had 
not affected them were located in small markets where 
handlers have few, if any, large retail outlets from 
which to secure such contracts.
Influence of nearby markets
Managers believed they would be in a strong posi­
tion to negotiate a premium or a premium increase if 
one or more nearby cooperatives were able to do so. 
They believed that gains won by a nearby cooperative 
could be used as leverage against local handlers.
Although milk strikes are rarely used, they may be 
one method of securing gains for cooperative members. 
A successful strike may be beneficial to both the co­
operative calling the strike and to cooperatives in near­
by markets. It can make handlers in nearby markets 
aware of the possible success of a milk strike in their 
own markets and therefore, less reluctant to negotiate 
with their cooperatives.
The results of negotiations in nearby markets in­
fluence the premium a cooperative can negotiate and 
the amount of milk it can sell. The data in table 4 
indicate that the handlers of all cooperatives studied
could have obtained milk in 6 or more months of 1963 
at a lower price than they paid the local cooperative. 
The table shows, for example, that Detroit handlers 
could have obtained milk from a cooperative supplying 
the Duluth market during 8 months of 1963 at a lower 
total cost (Duluth price plus transportation to Detroit) 
than they actually paid for class I milk. Hence, if a 
cooperative in one of these 10 markets called a milk 
strike, its handlers could probably get milk from an 
alternative source for a net price no higher than the 
cooperative is presently getting.
If prices vary widely among markets, handlers may 
obtain milk from an alternative source even if the 
cooperative does not call a milk strike. Thus, there is 
good reason for cooperatives to attempt to keep price 
differences among markets in line with transportation 
costs.
Some managers interviewed do attempt to work 
together to keep dealers’ price differences among mar­
kets in line with transportation costs. Also, some co­
operatives refuse to ship milk into markets where an-
Table 4. Number of months during 1963 in which handlers in a 
given market could have obtained Class I milk cheaper 
from an alternative source.*
Markets in which dealer's buying price was 
higher than dealer's buying price in the 
alternative market plus transportation cost 
from the alternative market to this marketb
Alternative
market
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Eau Claire . . 
Green Bay .. 
Madison ....  
Milwaukee . .
Beloit ...... .
Rockford ... 
Mason City . 
Waterloo ... 
Cedar Rapids 
Moline . . . . .  
Des Moines . 
Sioux City ..
Omaha ......
Burlington 
Chicago ....  
South Bend . 
Fort Wayne .
Toledo ......
Detroit ......
8
7 — 1
8 7 8 5 5 12 8 12 12 12
12 12 12 II II 12 12 12 12 12
6 — 1 — — 4 — 4 12 12
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1 _ 12 12
9 7 ~ 8 1 9 5 — 5 12 12
12 — 12 1 12 8 — 8 12 12
12 _ 12 — _ 8 _ 8 12 7
12 — 11 — — 8 — 8 3 9
12 — —  — — 4 — 4 4 10
4 — 4 — —
9
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12
’ Source: U. S. Dept. Agr. Fluid milk and cream report. Jan. 1963- 
Dec. 1963 issues.
b Transportation costs from the alternative source markets were as­
sumed to be (3.4 ~f- 0.16 X) cents per hundredweight, where X --  
miles between markets. William T. Butz. Long-distance shipment ot 
market milk. U. S. Dept. Agr. Mktg. Res. Rept. 648. 1964.
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other cooperative is attempting to gain a reasonable 
premium by withholding milk. However, this spirit of 
cooperation does not exist among all bargaining co­
operatives. In one instance, a cooperative, withholding 
milk from a handler who refused to pay the coopera­
tive’s asking price, was forced to lower its asking price 
when another cooperative agreed to ship milk to this 
handler at a lower price. In another case, a bargaining 
cooperative (call it A ), not located in a federal-order 
market and not included in this study, is alleged to 
charge handlers in its market a price considerably be­
low the federal-order price in two nearby federal-order 
markets. Cooperative A’s action makes it nearly im­
possible for the two cooperatives (call them B and C) 
in the federal-order markets to negotiate a premium 
on Class I milk. Furthermore, cooperative A has re­
fused to agree to expand the federal-order markets to 
include its marketing area even though such an ex­
pansion would make it easier to keep prices in line 
in these three markets. Actions by cooperatives such 
as A seriously restrict the bargaining effectiveness of 
nearby cooperatives such as B and C.
It is possible that the total receipts by members of 
cooperatives A, B and C would be higher if they co­
operated with each other but that the members of 
cooperative A would receive less by working with B 
and C. The gain to the members of B and C would 
come at the expense of the members of A. But possibly 
these three cooperatives could cooperate with each other 
if A’s members could be assured that they would share 
in the joint gain.
State and local regulations
Some state and local milk regulations may impede 
the flow of milk among markets. There are four pri­
mary ways that state and local sanitary regulations 
may restrict the movement of milk.6 First, they may 
prohibit certain activities, such as the distribution of 
milk pasteurized in a plant located beyond the city 
limits. Second, regulations of different localities may 
differ on details that have no public health signifi­
cance but that tend to restrict the flow of milk between 
localities. Third, regulations may be discriminatorily 
applied and enforced. Finally, duplication of inspec­
tion with substantial inspection fees may limit the num­
ber of outlets one cooperative can supply with milk.
Restrictive regulation in any market may limit the 
number of potential milk sources for handlers located 
in the market. This tends to enhance the bargaining 
power of the cooperative whose members are regular 
suppliers to this market. It also tends to weaken the 
bargaining power of the cooperatives that might sup­
ply milk to the market in the absence of restrictive 
regulation.
There are at least two instances where this type 
of regulation may affect the cooperatives in this study. 
Before milk may be shipped to Burlington, Iowa, the
6 U.S. Department of Agriculture. Regulations affecting the movement 
and merchandising of milk. U.S. Dept. Agr. Mktg. Res. Rept. 98. 1955.
milk producer must receive a permit and pay an in­
spection fee of $10 per year. T o  ship milk into St. Louis, 
Missouri, an inspection fee of 4 cents per hundredweight 
is required unless waived by the local authorities. Such 
fee requirements do not prevent the shipment of milk 
into Burlington and St. Louis— nevertheless, they mean 
an additional expense that may make these markets an 
uneconomic alternative outlet and thereby reduce a 
cooperative’s type II bargaining power.
Information Secured by Cooperatives
Bargaining agents frequently emphasize the need 
for increasing their knowledge about market condi­
tions, demand conditions, available supplies of farm 
products, industry developments, membership problems, 
etc., if they are to be successful in bargaining.
Demand for milk and milk products
Table 5 indicates the extent to which managers 
interviewed attempt to keep informed about the chang­
ing conditions of demand for milk and milk products. 
Keeping track of supply-demand adjustments, milk 
sales to handlers, reports from handlers on their sales 
and use of milk, and retail price changes keeps a man­
ager informed of current conditions in his market.
Prices of Class II milk are closely related to the 
farm price of manufacturing grade milk and prices of 
processed dairy products. These prices, in turn, are af­
fected by price support activities of the United States 
Department of Agriculture Commodity Credit Corpora­
tion (C C C ). Six of the managers interviewed obtain 
information on support price levels and purchases of 
the CCC.
Most of the managers interviewed try to keep in­
formed of the changing demand conditions for milk 
and milk products. Eight of the managers listed at 
least six of the sources shown in table 5. One manager 
listed one of the 10 sources, and a second listed four.
Alternative sources of milk for handlers
Every manager interviewed was aware of the ex­
istence and location of alternative milk supplies. The
Table 5. Number of managers securing various types of informa­
tion on the demand for milk and milk products.
Number of
Information secured cooperatives
Size of supply-demand adjustment in effect in the
federal o rde r...................................................    3
Changes in price formulas of other federal orders...........  8
Sales to handlers ........................................................  8
Reports from handlers on sales and utilization ...............  7
Price changes at retail .........................................    6
Changes in C C C  support purchases of surplus dairy
products ............................................................    6
Changes in C C C  support price level for dairy products .. 6
Agricultural outlook information from state university . . ..  4
Success or failure of other cooperatives in
negotiating with handlers ..............................................  8
Farm or dairy newspapers and magazines......................    4
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Table 6. Producer milk not used for Class I purposes by regulated 
handlers in several North Central federal-order markets, 
1963*
Federal-order market Pounds
____________________________________________________(000)
Chicago ..........................    3,596,662
South Bend-LaPorte-Elkhart....................................... 52,460
Rock River V a lley ...................................................  26,292
Milwaukee ........................................ .. . ................ 127,615
Southern M ich igan .................................................. 1,527,003
Muskegon ......................................   43,112
Upstate Michigan .................................................. 26,772
Michigan Upper Peninsula ....................................... 33,266
Northeastern Wisconsin .......................................... 196,699
Madison ...............................................................  64,661
Quad Cities-Dubuque .............................................  92,658
Nebraska-Western Iowa .......................................... 105,754
Sioux City ............................................................  19,154
Minneapolis-St. Paul ..............................................  420,008
Duluth-Superior . . . . ..............................................  69,049
Cedar Rapids-lowa City ..........................................  84,097
North Central Iowa ................................................  38,083
Des Moines .................................................   78,806
a Source: U. S. Dept. Agr. Federal milk order market statistics, an­
nual summary for 1963. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bui. 345. 1964.
principal alternative sources of milk mentioned were 
other cooperatives located in Minnesota, Wisconsin or 
Iowa, and most alternative sources were located within 
the milkshed of federal-order markets.
The cooperatives studied— with the exception of the 
Chicago and Detroit cooperatives— were also aware that 
their entire volume could easily be replaced by milk 
from these alternative sources. The amount of milk 
received by handlers in several federal-order markets 
in the North Central Region that was in excess of fluid 
milk or Class I sales in 1963 is shown in table 6. This 
milk could have been used as Class I milk in other 
markets.7 Data on the total 1963 volumes of the co­
operatives listed in table 2 are available, but not pub­
lished here. When we compared these volumes with 
the 1963 volumes listed in table 6, however, we found 
that sufficient milk was available to replace the entire 
volume of any of the cooperatives studied except Chi­
cago and Detroit.
The Detroit cooperative controls practically all milk 
produced in Michigan through its own operations and 
through the operation of a federation of all Michigan 
dairy cooperatives. Thus, Detroit handlers would not 
be likely to secure milk from any other Michigan fed­
eral-order market during a milk withholding action. And 
the Chicago cooperative would probably not supply 
milk to Detroit handlers during an attempt by the De­
troit cooperative to negotiate a premium. Also, Chi­
cago handlers are not likely to get milk from other 
cooperatives in Chicago or Michigan during an attempt
7 This does not, o f course, exhaust the entire supply of milk that could 
have been used for Class I milk in other markets. It is, however, believed 
to represent the major portion of the total since most of the major fluid 
milk markets are regulated by federal orders, even though much of the 
area in some states is not regulated by a federal order. Adequate data 
for estimating the total amount of surplus milk available from unregulated 
markets are not available.
by the Chicago cooperative to negotiate a higher price 
for its milk. There is a federation of Chicago area co­
operatives. Furthermore, since the Chicago coopera­
tive controls an estimated 40 percent of the total grade 
A milk production in its procurement area, which in­
cludes the entire market area of the Milwaukee, Rock 
River Valley and South Bend-LaPorte-Elkhart federal 
orders and about one-fourth of the Madison federal 
order, it may control as much as 125 million pounds 
of the milk listed in table 6 for these latter four federal 
orders.
Combining the remaining milk not used in Class I 
products in the Milwaukee, Rock River Valley, South 
Bend-LaPorte-Elkhart and Madison federal-order mar­
kets with that of the other Wisconsin, Minnesota and 
Iowa federal-order markets listed in table 6 yields 
slightly over 1.25 billion pounds of surplus milk. As­
suming that 15 percent of this surplus is needed for 
operating reserve leaves 1.06 billion pounds of sur­
plus milk available to Chicago and Detroit handlers— 
enough to replace about 40 percent of either the Chi­
cago or the Detroit cooperative’s volume.
These figures may underestimate the amount of milk 
that would be available to Chicago and Detroit hand­
lers if cooperatives supplying these markets withheld 
milk. In 1963 in the 13-state area of the 12 North 
Central states plus Kentucky, 9.1 billion pounds of 
grade A milk were not used for Class I products in 
federal-order markets. If we deduct from this figure 
the grade A milk not used in Class I products in the 
markets listed in the two preceding paragraphs and 
in Fort Wayne, Toledo and in the northeastern Ohio 
order and then deduct 15 percent of the remainder, we 
obtain 3.4 billion pounds of milk. This represents the 
amount of milk that could have been available to Chi­
cago and Detroit handlers from all federal-order mar­
kets in the region other than the excluded markets. 
Detroit and Chicago handlers would probably be un­
able to obtain milk from Fort Wayne, Toledo or north­
eastern Ohio because of the existence o f the Great Lakes 
Milk Marketing Federation. This figure of 3.4 billion 
is only about 25 percent greater than the annual volume 
of the Chicago cooperative, 20 percent greater than the 
annual volume of the Detroit cooperative and about 
60 percent of the volume of both cooperatives. Detroit 
and Chicago handlers would, therefore, be hard pressed 
to find milk if the cooperatives in these two markets 
called a milk strike.
Producers supplying these two markets receive sub­
stantial premiums over federal milk-marketing order 
prices— much larger premiums than producers in other 
markets receive. These findings on the scarcity of al­
ternative sources of milk for these two markets and 
the abundance of alternative sources of milk for other 
markets help to explain the differences in premiums.
Alternative outlets for the cooperative's milk
Only two of the cooperatives studied— Waterloo and 
Cedar Rapids— shipped a substantial volume of milk
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to fluid-milk markets in the South. The Omaha, Chi­
cago and Detroit cooperatives shipped small amounts 
to some southern and western markets as requests came 
from cooperatives in these markets. The other coopera­
tive managers listed processing plants owned by the 
cooperative or by nearby cooperatives as the only alter­
native markets for their milk. Most of the plants listed 
were butter and nonfat dry milk processing plants. If 
an alternative outlet was needed for milk now used 
in class I, most of the cooperatives studied would mar­
ket this milk in lower-priced outlets.
Services for Members
One way for an organization to maintain member­
ship support and loyalty is to effectively serve a num­
ber of its members’ wants or needs rather than just one 
or two wants or needs. Dairy bargaining cooperatives 
can do this by: (a) keeping members informed of the 
activities of the cooperative through group membership 
meetings, monthly newsletters, market information let­
ters, annual reports, etc.; (b) having fieldmen who make 
personal contacts with members; (c) distributing co­
operative earnings; and (d) providing a variety of 
services for members.8 Table 7 lists services provided 
by cooperatives in this study.
The first three services constitute the cooperative’s 
bargaining activities. The other services are aimed at 
expanding the demand for dairy products, at increas­
ing members’ production efficiency, at providing items 
used in milk production at a discount or at helping mem­
bers in other ways.
COOPERATIVE OBJECTIVES
Information was collected from each cooperative 
manager on the objectives of his cooperative and the 
relative importance of each objective. From discussions 
with managers and with dairy marketing extension 
workers, a list of seven objectives was developed. Each
f The maintenance of_ membership support and its relation to bargain­
ing power is discussed in: Ladd, op. cit.
manager was given the list and asked to rank the 
objectives in order of importance to his own coopera­
tive, assigning number one to the most important, num­
ber two to the second most important, etc. These ob­
jectives, with their ranking by each of nine different 
managers, are recorded in table 8 (one cooperative 
manager did not respond to this questionnaire). The 
fractions indicate ties. For example, cooperative 3 con­
sidered objectives 2 and 7 of equal importance and 
considered them more important (ranked them higher) 
than any of the other objectives. The last column of 
table 8 presents the pooled average rank for each objec­
tive.
Some of these objectives are interrelated. Objectives 
4 and 5 both represent a desire of the cooperative to 
increase its size. The low ranks assigned objective 5 may 
be related to the high ranks assigned objectives 1, 2 and 
3. The attainment of these latter three objectives may 
be more difficult if procurement area is enlarged. For 
example, if the cooperative enlarges its procurement 
area, its Class I utilization ratio will fall unless it finds 
a market for more Class I milk. There was also a tend-
Table 7. Services provided to members by the cooperatives 
studied.
Number of
Service provided to members cooperatives
Bargaining for the price of m ilk ................................  10
Bargaining for a service charge premium ....................  10
Bargaining for a bulk tank premium............................  9
Conduct quality improvement work for use by members . . 10
Conduct quality education programs for members........ 10
Conduct quality control and inspection programs ........ 10
Test and weigh m ilk ....................................................  9
Help members achieve production efficiency ..............  7
Stock and distribute milk production supplies..............  10
Assemble market information for use by members........ 9
Pick up and deliver m ilk ...........................................  6
Provide insurance policies for members ...................... 8
Provide credit for members.........................................  6
Acquire and maintain facilities for handling surplus milk . 9
Engage in local promotional programs .......................  10
Contribute to the promotional programs of the
American Dairy Association .........................................  8
Table 8. Importance of various objectives to nine dairy bargaining cooperatives studied.*
Rankings by cooperatives numbered l-9b Pooled
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ranking
1— Negotiating a price that will give members the highest 
possible net return for milk ................................  1 3 5 4 2.5 2.5 1 5 1 2
2— Maintaining a market for members' milk ...............  2 1 1.5 1 2.5 1 2 3 2 1
3— Maintaining past highest percentage of Class I sales 5 2 3 3 2.5 4 3 4 4 3
 ^ Securing 100-percent control of milk produced in
procurement area ..............................................  4 4 4 6 5 7 6 1 6.5 5
5 Increasing the size of procurement a re a .................  7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 6.5 7
6 Negotiating for the estimated value of services
performed for handlers ....................................... 3 6 6 5 6 5 5 6 3 6
7 Maintaining good relations with handlers ..............  6 5 1.5 2 2.5 2.5 4 2 5 4
■r. r  s 0 ,0  n u m o e re a  a iT T e re n n y  n e re  m a n  in  T ao ie  z .
lied rankings are each assigned the average of the ranks they would have been assigned had no ties occurred.
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ency for cooperatives ranking objective 1 relatively high 
to rank objective 7 relatively high.
Each cooperative’s rankings are also related to var­
ious factors peculiar to the individual cooperative. 
Cooperatives selling a high proportion of their 1963 
volume to Class I outlets tended to rank the objectives 
similarly; cooperatives selling small proportions to Class 
I outlets also tended to rank the objectives similarly. 
Cooperatives who received relatively large Class I pre­
miums in 1963 tended to rank the objectives similarly; 
but they ranked them differently from cooperatives who 
received small premiums. Cooperatives owning processing 
plants large enough to process much of their own milk 
ranked the objectives differently from cooperatives 
with relatively small or no processing facilities.
The three cooperatives whose managers assigned the 
first objective the highest rank had sufficient processing 
facilities to handle 60 percent or more of their entire 
milk volume. Thus, these three cooperatives would be 
assured of an outlet for most of their milk if they 
decided to withhold milk from handlers. The remaining 
six cooperatives either had no processing facilities or 
had facilities that could handle a smaller percentage 
of the cooperative’s total volume. Managers of coopera­
tives close to Eau Claire, Wisconsin, (which is near the 
heart of the surplus grade A milk production region) 
generally ranked objective 1 lower than did managers 
distant from Eau Claire.
Cooperatives selling large proportions of their milk 
for Class I use ranked objectives 2 and 3 relatively high. 
Managers of cooperatives located in markets where the 
average handler is relatively large tended to rank objec­
tive 2 relatively low and objective 4 relatively high. If 
a large proportion o f the cooperative’s milk could be 
easily replaced from alternative sources, the manager 
ranked objective 4 relatively low. Managers in markets 
with large handlers ranked objective 6 lower than man­
agers in markets with smaller handlers. On the average, 
objective 7 was ranked high if milk was easily available 
from alternative sources and was ranked low if either
(a) a large number of handlers bargained with the 
cooperative in 1963 or (b) the cooperative could have 
processed much of its milk in its own processing plant.
M EAN S OF SECU R IN G  B A R G A IN IN G  G A IN S  
Recognition
Before an organization can effectively represent its 
members in bargaining with handlers, the handlers must 
recognize that the organization is the sole marketing 
agent for members’ milk. An obvious measure of the 
organization’s effectiveness in securing this recognition 
is the proportion of handlers who will bargain with the 
cooperative.
Each cooperative manager was asked : O f those proc­
essors and distributors with whom you attempted to 
bargain in 1963, how many would and how many would 
not bargain with you?
The percentage of the handlers who would bargain
with each cooperative is related to the average annual 
volume of milk processed per handler. This relation is 
shown in table 9. The average proportion of handlers 
willing to bargain is greater in markets with large han­
dlers than in markets with small handlers. The table 
represents an average relation. For example, there are 
markets in which the average annual volume per han­
dler is 8 million pounds and all handlers will bargain 
with the cooperative, and there are markets in which 
the average annual volume per handler is 8 million 
pounds and less than 90 percent of the handlers will 
bargain. On the average, in markets where the average 
annual volume per handler is 8 million pounds, about 
90 percent of the handlers will bargain with the coop­
erative.
It is advantageous for a cooperative to control as 
much of the milk in its procurement area as possible to 
eliminate one alternative source of supply to handlers— 
independent producers. In addition, as exemplified by 
the Chicago and Detroit cooperatives, if the coopera­
tive has a large volume, there may be insufficient sur­
plus milk available from alternative sources to replace 
its milk. Then, all the cooperative’s handlers could not 
get milk from an alternative source.
Cooperatives may benefit from economies of large- 
scale operations just as can processing firms; eg., the 
average costs of office operations and route pickup and 
milk delivery may be lower for larger dairy cooperatives 
than for smaller ones. The 1963 annual operating costs 
per hundredweight of milk handled for six of the coop­
eratives studied, exclusive of pickup, delivery and proc­
essing costs, ranged from 3.06 to 6.00 cents. Analysis 
indicated that operating costs per hundredweight de­
clined, on the average, by about 1 cent for every 1-bil­
lion-pound increase in annual cooperative volume. It 
takes a large increase in milk volume to have any appre­
ciable effect on average cost.
Mergers and Federations
One way for a dairy cooperative to increase its 
volume is to sign up more producers in its procurement 
area— either independent producers or members of an­
other cooperative. There are limitations to this type of
Table 9. Average relation between average annual volume of 
handlers served by a cooperative in a market and p^ro­
portion of handlers in that market willing to bargain.
Av. annual volume of handlers Percentage of handlers who
Served by cooperative would bargain with cooperative
(millions of pounds)
1 ......................................  28
2  ...................................... 55
3  ...................................... 69
4  ...................................... 77
5  .....................................  82
6  ........................................  86
7 ................................   89
8 ...........................     91
9  ...................................... 92
10........................................ 94
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activity, however. It may lead to poor relationships with 
other cooperatives; also, adding more members and in­
creasing volume without increasing the number of fluid- 
milk outlets will result in a lower Class I utilization ratio 
and a lower net price to members. There was no ev­
idence suggesting that any of the cooperatives studied 
do attempt to secure the members of other cooperatives. 
Most of them do, however, attempt to sign up independ­
ent producers.
Another method of increasing volume is by merger. 
Since individual cooperatives lose their previous identity 
and autonomy in a merger by combining membership, 
volume and resources and by sharing outlets for milk, 
both of the limitations mentioned for signing up in­
dependent producers or members of other cooperatives 
can be eliminated through a merger. There are, of 
course, problems that have to be worked out to elim­
inate or reduce conflict within the new organization 
(e.g., how many members shall each cooperative con­
tribute to the board of directors, who shall pay the bur­
den of the previous cooperatives’ debts and how shall 
milk be pooled) .9 There has been a number of dairy 
cooperative mergers in recent years. Several coopera­
tives visited in this study have recently been involved in 
mergers.
A cooperative federation, in contrast to a merger, 
involves a uniting of two or more cooperatives so that 
each of the participating cooperatives retains its local 
autonomy and identity. Thus, the problems of consol­
idating two or more cooperatives into one are elim­
inated. Competition among member cooperatives is still 
possible, however, even though one of the objectives of 
a federation is to coordinate the activities of all coop­
eratives in the group. Maintaining loyalty to the federa­
tion among member cooperatives may become difficult. 
A decision that is desirable from the standpoint of all 
farmers involved in the federation may not be desirable 
to the members of one or more individual cooperatives. 
Pooling arrangements are a problem to be worked out 
by the individual cooperatives in the federation.
Two different types of federations may be formed. 
One is the regional federation exemplified by: (a) 
United Dairy Producers Cooperative, organized in 1960 
and consisting of the Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, Water­
loo and Moline cooperatives; (b) Central Southwest 
Regional Stock Cooperative, organized in 1964 and con­
sisting of the Omaha cooperative, the Denver Milk Pro­
ducers Association, the Southwest Milk Producers Asso­
ciation in Wichita, the Central West Texas Milk Pro­
ducers Association in Abilene and the Dairy Farmers 
Cooperative Association in Albuquerque; and (c) the 
Great Lakes Milk Marketing Federation, organized in 
1960 and consisting of the Detroit cooperative, North­
west Cooperative Sales in Toledo, the Cleveland Milk 
Producers Federation, the Dairymen’s Cooperative Sales 
Association in Pittsburgh, the Akron Milk Producers
Pooling refers to the procedures used to combine receipts from sales 
of milk to various handlers and processors, to determine the amount to 
be paid each cooperative for_ its services to members and to determine 
the price each farmer will receive.
Association and the Wayne Cooperative Milk Producers 
in Fort Wayne.
Federations such as these perform several valuable 
functions: (a) They can eliminate duplication of routes 
and capitalize on economies of large size in farm-to- 
market milk hauling when procurement areas overlap,
(b) They may operate a central sales agency to coor­
dinate off-the-market sales, (c) They can work to 
establish reasonable or proper price relationships be­
tween markets regulated by separate federal orders, (d) 
They may bargain jointly with several or all bottling 
plants of a regional or national firm to replace a situa­
tion in which each cooperative bargains with one or two 
plants of that firm, (e) They can coordinate the move­
ment of Class II milk between markets served by mem­
ber cooperatives, (f) They can undertake joint bargain­
ing efforts to replace the individual bargaining efforts 
of member cooperatives. Successful performance of these 
functions increases the bargaining effectiveness of the 
cooperatives in the organization.
Additional advantages of a federation as listed by 
managers were: (a) It allows the people from one coop­
erative to become better acquainted with the people 
from other cooperatives and with their specific prob­
lems. (b) It allows the trading of valuable information 
concerning the operations in nearby markets and the 
influence of these operations on one’s own market and 
bargaining ability, (c) It allows the exchange of valu­
able information on conditions in the industry in gen­
eral. (d) It eliminates the problem of inheriting extra 
surplus milk as a result of a merger.
The disadvantage mentioned by all managers who 
had been involved in federations was the difficulty of 
reconciling differences of opinion among members of 
different cooperatives in the federation; i.e., what is 
good for the federation members as a whole is not neces­
sarily equally good for the members of each cooperative. 
Personal problems between officials of different coop­
eratives in the federation are difficult to avoid and may 
become a threat to the effectiveness and existence of the 
federation.
A second type of federated activity is exemplified 
by superpools. These are strictly joint bargaining efforts 
among a number of local cooperatives, where the milk 
supply of all cooperatives is combined and the nego­
tiated premium money is distributed to the members of 
these cooperatives on the basis of some predetermined 
pooling system. One superpool, in the Chicago market, 
contains the Pure Milk Association along with 23 other 
cooperatives. A second superpool, in southern Michigan, 
contains the Michigan Milk Producers Association along 
with eight other cooperatives. The characteristics and 
problems of these two superpools are similar to those of 
the federations previously discussed. The difference is 
primarily in the emphasis placed on joint bargaining 
and in the area covered.
Federations do not increase the volume of any coop­
erative involved. Nevertheless, they allow joint control 
over a larger volume of milk than the volume of any
one cooperative in the federation. For example, all 
cooperatives in the Chicago area bargain jointly with 
handlers, and if this group of cooperatives decided to 
withhold milk from a handler, the handler would have 
to go outside the local market to get milk unless local 
independent producers could provide enough milk to 
meet his needs. If the superpool were not in operation 
and one cooperative decided to withhold its milk from 
a handler, this handler could turn to other cooperatives 
in the Chicago market for milk.
Type I Bargaining Power
Type I bargaining power was defined as bargaining 
power stemming from advantages that can be offered 
to the opponent in return for accepting one’s terms. 
Dairy bargaining cooperatives exercise this power 
through the performance of various services o f benefit 
to milk dealers. One of the reasons dairy bargaining 
cooperatives are able to negotiate a price for members’ 
milk in excess of the federal-order minimum price is 
the various services they offer to milk dealers. Table 10 
contains a list of the services offered to dealers by each 
cooperative studied.
If a cooperative performs the service of producer 
check writing, a handler needs to write only one check, 
payable to the cooperative. The cooperative then writes 
checks to the individual members to pay them for their 
milk. If the cooperative does not perform this service, 
the handler must write the checks to each individual 
member.
Until recently grade A milk producers handled their 
milk in 10-gallon cans. If all producers serving a handler 
cool their milk in bulk tanks, the handler can reduce 
his costs of receiving milk. When a cooperative shifts 
to bulk handling of milk and helps members to shift, 
it performs a useful service for the handler.
Most managers believed that the cooperative’s ability 
to full-supply handlers was the most important service 
they could offer. In full-supplying a handler, the coop­
erative agrees to provide exactly that quantity of milk 
needed by the handler. If assured of a full supply of 
milk, the handler bottling milk only 5 days per week
does not have to incur the costs of handling and storing 
milk received from producers the other 2 days of the 
week. Further, the handler need not worry about run­
ning short of milk any day since day-to-day variations 
in the handler’s milk supply are eliminated. (The coop­
erative agrees to find an outlet for any excess milk and 
to find an extra supply if the handler’s needs cannot be 
met with member milk.) A cooperative with a full- 
supply contract diverts milk of those producers who 
normally supply a handler from that handler’s bottling 
plant to a processing plant if the handler does not need 
the milk. This saves the handler the cost of disposing of 
unneeded milk.
Every cooperative indicated that it full-supplied han­
dlers; however, there were no legal instruments used in 
connection with this service.
The value of the services listed in table 10 for each 
cooperative is the manager’s estimate o f the average 
value of the services provided handlers. Five of the 
cooperatives negotiate a premium on Class I milk equal 
to the estimated value of the services they provide 
handlers.
The variation in the values of service may be due to 
several things. Different handlers do not place the same 
value on a given service. For example, two different 
handlers may realize quite different advantages from a 
full-supply arrangement, and different firms might re­
alize different savings by converting from can to bulk 
handling of milk.
If there were no advantages other than price to 
purchasing milk locally, it seems reasonable to expect 
that a handler would purchase milk from an alternative 
source if he could get it at a lower price. Thus, if the 
price a handler pays the local cooperative exceeds the 
price he would have to pay to get milk from an alter­
native source, we take this excess to represent the value 
to handlers of obtaining milk from the local cooperative.
T o determine the extent of this excess for each coop­
erative studied, we take Eau Claire, Wisconsin, to be 
the region of heavy surplus grade A production and 
the alternative source of milk for the handlers of these 
cooperatives. After deducting from the average annual
Table 10. Services offered handlers by dairy bargaining cooperatives interviewed.
Cooperative*
Service offered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Producer check writing ......................... . .X X X X X X X X X
Bulk handling of milk .......................... . .X X X X X X X X X X
Maintaining high-quality milk ............... . .X X X X X X X X X
Product standardization ....................... X X X X
Full-supply contracts ............................ . .X X X X X X X X X X
Wash handlers' tanks ....................... .
Diversion of milk other than Class 1 to:
X
Own processing p la n t .................... . .X X X X X X
Other processing plants ................. X X X X X X X X
Pick up milk of producers supplying plants
acquired by handlers .......................
Value of services offered15
X
(cents per hundredweight) .............. . .34 l7'/2 20 121/2 29 7'A 7 71/2 30 10
* Cooperative numbers correspond to the cooperative numbers shown in table 8. 
b Estimated by the respective cooperative managers.
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dealer’s buying price for fluid milk in a given market
(a) the average annual dealer’s buying price for fluid 
milk in Eau Claire and (b) the cost of transporting 
milk from Eau Claire to the given market, we arrive at 
the data presented in table l l . 10 These data, then, are 
estimates of the value to handlers of securing milk from 
the local cooperative in preference to securing milk 
from Eau Claire sources. In only one case was the value 
to handlers of securing milk from the local cooperative, 
as calculated in table 11, lower than the cooperative’s 
estimate of the value of services offered these handlers. 
For one cooperative, the value recorded in table 11 
exceeded the cooperative’s estimate of the value of serv­
ices provided handlers by more than 20 cents per hun­
dredweight.
The variation in the figures in table 11 indicates 
that handlers secure milk from the local source for other 
reasons than merely to obtain the benefit of the services 
provided by the local cooperative or the cooperatives 
studied underestimate the value of the services they 
provide handlers or both.
Values were computed for several additional markets 
in Michigan. These are also shown in table 11. The 
values in table 11 average higher for markets located a 
distance from the surplus production region than for 
markets located near to this region.
There are other reasons for the differences among 
the figures in table 11: (a) Sanitary requirements for 
milk production are not universally the same, and a 
price adjustment may be necessary in some markets to 
reflect the different costs associated with meeting these 
different requirements, (b) The transportation cost 
function used in this analysis is only an average relation. 
Transportation rates are a subject for bargaining just 
as are milk prices, (c) Some handlers may be willing to 
pay a higher price for locally produced milk for local 
consumption— for advertising purposes. And some han­
dlers may be willing to pay a higher price for locally 
produced milk because a local cooperative is a more 
dependable source of supply in bad weather, (d) Some 
cooperatives have such a large volume that their milk 
could not be replaced from alternative sources either at 
the same or at a lower price. Hence, handlers in mar­
kets served  ^by these large cooperatives may be more 
willing to pay a higher price than are handlers in other 
markets.
Type II Bargaining Power
Type II bargaining power consists of the bargainer’s 
ability to enforce unfavorable consequences upon the 
opponent if he refuses to accept the stated terms. A 
cooperative may be able to exercise type II power by 
withholding milk from bottlers. Whether a cooperative 
can, in fact, subject handlers to losses by withholding 
milk depends upon the availability of alternative sup­
plies of milk for the handlers. The only cooperatives 
studied that are in a position to subject handlers to
10 T L  .
hold herame transportatw>n cost function used in table 4 is assumed to
Table II.  Estimated average annual value to handlers of obtain­
ing milk from the local cooperative, 1963/
Market Cents per hundredweight1*
Burlington, Iowa . ............................................  23.0
Waterloo, Iowa .......................... ............. .... 18.5
Cedar Rapids, Iowa ........................................  12.5
Des Moines, Iowa ...........................................  27.0
Omaha, Nebraska ...................................................................  31.0
Moline, Illinois ................................................  |3,o
Mason City, Iowa ..............    24.5
Sioux City, Iowa .............................................  46.0
Chicago, Illinois ............................................. 22.0
Detroit, Michigan ...........................................  42.0
Kalamazoo, Michigan ....................................... 45.0
Muskegon, Michigan ....................................... 38.0
Traverse City, Michigan ..................................  34.0
Marquette, Michigan ....................................... 10.0
Sault Sainte Marie, Michigan ............................  12.0
Source: U. S. Dept. Agr. Federal milk order market statistics, an­
nual summary for 1963. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bui. 345. 1964.
Computed by deducting from the average 1963 dealer's buying 
price in market indicated the sum of (a) average annual dealer's 
buying price for fluid milk in Eau Claire and (b) cost of transporta­
tion from Eau Claire to indicated market.
losses by withholding milk are cooperatives in the 
Chicago and Detroit markets.
Even if a cooperative is large, it may not be able to 
exercise type II power. Whether it can or not depends 
upon various internal and external factors.11 Tw o of 
these factors are members’ attitudes toward a milk 
strike and possible cost of the strike.
Attitude toward striking
Most of the cooperatives studied showed little in­
terest in calling a milk strike under 1963-64 conditions. 
Seven of the 10 managers said that they would not call 
a milk strike under 1963-64 conditions to obtain a high­
er milk price. Three of these seven indicated that they 
would withhold milk from handlers only if one or more 
handlers became so antagonistic toward the cooperative 
that the cooperative preferred not to conduct any busi­
ness with them. The principal reason given by these 
seven managers for not calling a strike was that there 
is too much surplus milk available. Each manager ex­
pressed fear that his cooperative would permanently 
lose an outlet for its milk.
In 1961, for example, one cooperative withheld milk 
from a handler who was taking nearly 60 percent of 
the cooperative’s Class I milk. During some months of 
1964 this same handler was taking less than 5 percent 
of the cooperative’s Class I milk— the bulk of the han­
dler’s milk coming from independent producers. In 
1952, a cooperative not covered in this study with­
held milk from one handler. It is reported that this 
handler now obtains at least half of its milk from in­
dependent producers. Thus, the attempted strikes not 
only failed to achieve their objectives, but also encour­
aged the handlers to line up a permanent alternative 
source of milk.
11 These factors are discussed in: Ladd, op. cit.
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Other reasons given for not calling a milk strike 
were: (a) the cooperative and handlers have already 
agreed upon reasonable prices through the federal or­
der, (b) a strike could bring on a lawsuit and (c) it is 
against the cooperative’s belief to call a milk strike.
All seven cooperatives expressing reluctance at call­
ing a milk strike were relatively small. The total volume 
of each could easily be replaced by alternative sources 
of milk in Wisconsin and Minnesota. Two of the three 
cooperatives who would call a milk strike— Chicago and 
Detroit— had volumes in 1963 of nearly 3 billion pounds 
— a volume that could not easily be replaced, as we have 
seen before. The three cooperatives who would call a 
milk strike under 1963-64 conditions had an outlet for 
much or all of their milk supply in their own processing 
plants. The other seven cooperatives could process little 
or none of their milk in their own processing plants.
Two of the three cooperative managers indicating 
that they would call a milk strike under 1963-64 condi­
tions said they would prefer withholding milk from one 
or a few handlers to withholding from all handlers. One 
reason was that the cooperative might then use the 
whipsaw technique in negotiations. Gains acquired from 
one handler or a small group of handlers could be used 
as leverage in negotiations with other handlers. There 
was some reluctance to withhold milk from all handlers, 
because it would more than likely have to be diverted 
to lower-priced uses. (All managers interviewed believed 
that members would not consent to dumping milk.) 
One manager, however, indicated a preference for with­
holding milk from all handlers, since it would be more 
difficult for all handlers to obtain all the milk they need 
from alternative sources of milk than it would be for 
just one handler to obtain all the milk he needs from 
an alternative source.
Tw o important factors, then, determining whether 
or not a cooperative will strike are: (a) where the alter­
native sources of milk are located, the cost to handlers 
of securing this milk and the probability that the coop­
erative’s handlers will be able to secure sufficient milk 
from these sources to replace the milk being withheld 
and (b) what the cooperative would do with its mem­
bers’ milk. Other factors suggested by the managers 
included: (a) whether the handler is a small independ­
ent firm or a national chain; (b) whether the resulting 
public reaction, if any, would be favorable or unfavor­
able to the cooperative, whether there might be pressure 
from newspaper editorials and city officials and what 
legal repercussions are likely to result; (c) whether the 
economic conditions justify the cooperative’s demand; 
and (d) whether members will back the strike attempt. 
In determining how long the cooperative would with­
hold milk, the managers indicated that they would have 
to consider the expected public and legislative reaction, 
expectations of success or failure, availability of alter­
native sources of milk and member support.
Cost of a strike
Member support depends on the expected losses and 
the length o f time necessary to recover the strike losses.
Table 12. Cooperative's total and Class I volume per week during 
each month and amount by which total revenue from 
the sale of Class I milk at negotiated premiums of 3 
and 5 cents exceeds total revenue from the sale of
Class 1 milk at the federal-order minimum price.*
Additional revenue
per week from the sale
Total Class 1 of Class 1 milk at nego-
volume volume tiated premiums of:
Month per week per week 3 cents 5 cents
cwt. cwt.
June ....... ... 112,500 73,125 $2,193.75 $3,656.25
July ....... ... 106,250 74,380 2,231.40 3,719.00
August .. . ... 100,000 77,000 2,310.00 3,850.00
September ... 101,250 85,050 2,551.50 4,252.50
October . .... 108,750 94,610 2,838.30 4,730.50
November ... 111,250 91,230 2,736.30 4,561.50
December ... 112,500 90,000 2,700.00 4,500.00
January . ___ I I I  ,550 90,360 2,710.80 4,518.50
February ....  102,500 79,950 2,398.50 3,997.50
March ... .... 112,500 87,750 2,632.50 4,387.50
April .... . ... 108,750 82,650 2,479.50 4,132.50
May .... . ... 125,000 86,250 2,587.50 4,312.50
‘  The cooperative's annual total and Class I volume was allocated to 
each month on the basis of the actual monthly total and Class I 
volume distribution for the Des Moines federal order between June 
1962 and May 1963.
Losses and recovery time vary from case to case.
As an example, let us look at a cooperative that has 
an annual volume of 525 million pounds of 3.5-percent 
grade A milk located in a federal-order market. Also, 
suppose that
(a) the cooperative’s average weekly June volume 
is 11,250,000 pounds o f 3.5-percent milk,
(b) its June Class I utilization percentage is 65,
(c) the June federal-order prices are $3.96 and 
$3.02 per hundredweight for 3.5-percent Class I 
and II milk, respectively, and
(d) total and Class I volumes for the remaining 11 
months are as shown in table 12.
Cooperative gross income in June would be $408,487.50 
per week, as shown in the top three lines o f table 13.
If this cooperative called a milk strike on all its 
handlers throughout the first week in June and could 
find a Class I outlet for only 6.5 percent of its milk at a 
net price of $3.96 per hundredweight, with the remain­
der going into Class II outlets at $3.02 per hundred­
weight, the top three lines of table 14 show that the 
cooperative’s gross income in that week would be re­
duced by $61,863.75. Table 12 shows that the coopera­
tive would have recovered this amount by the end of 
the 16th week after the strike if a 5-cent per hundred­
weight premium on Class I milk were negotiated and by 
the end of the 25th week if only a 3-cent premium on 
Class I milk were negotiated. If the strike lasted 2 weeks, 
29 weeks would be required to recover the lost gross 
income with a 5-cent negotiated premium and 49 weeks 
with a 3-cent premium.
Now, assume that as a result of a 1-week strike 10 
percent of the cooperative’s Class I sales has been per­
manently lost; i.e., weekly Class I volumes are 10 percent 
less than the weekly Class I volumes listed in table 12.
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Under these conditions, the cooperative would have had 
to negotiate a premium of 10.4 cents per hundredweight 
during June on Class I milk to maintain the weekly 
gross income of $408,487.50. Depending on the class 
prices in future months, this premium may be insuffi­
cient to maintain this weekly income. Furthermore, it 
will not allow the cooperative to recover any of the 
income lost during the strike.
This time, assume that the cooperative also owns a 
butter-powder processing plant with a weekly capacity 
of 87,500 hundredweight of 3.5-percent milk. Suppose 
it costs the cooperative an average of 58.5 cents to proc­
ess one hundredweight of milk into butter and powder 
when processing 39,375 hundredweight of milk per week 
and it costs only 42 cents to process one hundredweight 
of milk into butter and powder when operating at 
capacity. Suppose the plant produces 1.125 pounds of 
butter per pound of butterfat and 8.6 pounds of nonfat 
dry milk per hundredweight of skimmilk.12 Combining 
these conditions, the total returns to be distributed to 
members for the first week in June are $412,836.45 (see 
table 13). Class II milk sales are included in total rev­
enue from the sale of milk, since members would receive 
this revenue even if the cooperative did not process sur­
plus milk. Thus, it must also be included as a cost to 
the processing plant.
Now if this cooperative called a milk strike and 
could find a Class I outlet for only 6.5 percent of its milk 
at a price of $3.96, with the remaining volume going to 
its processing plant and to other Class II outlets, the 
total cooperative returns distributed to members for the 
first week in June are computed in table 14.
The strike in this case would result in a reduction 
in the cooperative’s net income per week of $42,110.86. 
From the data in table 12, we find that the cooperative 
would have recovered the $42,110.86 by the end of the 
12th week if a 5-cent premium on Class I milk were 
negotiated and by the end of the 17th week if only a 
3-cent premium on Class I milk were negotiated. If the 
strike lasted 2 weeks, 20 weeks would be required to 
recover the lost net income when a 5-cent premium was 
negotiated and 34 weeks with a 3-cent premium.
These results emphasize the possible cost of a strike. 
The cost is likely to be lower for members of a coopera­
tive that has its own processing facilities than one that 
does not have these facilities. For example, if the strike 
lasts 1 week, in our hypothetical cases, the cooperative 
without processing facilities would incur a loss in income 
from the sale of milk of nearly 55 cents per hundred- 
weight, while the cooperative with processing facilities 
would incur a loss in net income of 37 cents per hun­
dredweight.
These losses are substantial and may not be re­
covered before 6 months have elapsed, even if the coop­
erative is successful in negotiating a premium with 
handlers. If members lack the financial resources to
ave,r^ e 0084 figures and these product yields are typical of 
wen-managed butter-powder plants.
withstand such losses, they are not likely to support the 
strike effort, and the cooperative may never recover the 
losses.
If the milk strike occurred during some other month 
having different total and Class I volumes, the milk 
strike losses and the time required to recover the strike 
losses would be different. If the strike occurred during 
a period of relatively low Class I volume, the strike losses 
would be less. If the strike were followed by a period 
of rising or high Class I volume, less time would be re­
quired to recover the strike losses than if the strike
Table 13. Calculation of member returns for first week of June 
if no strike were called.
Class 1 sales 73,125 cwt. @  $3.96 
Class II sales 39,375 cwt. @  $3.02
$289,575.00
118,912.50
TOTAL REVENUE FROM  
THE SALE OF MILK $408,487.50
BUTTER-POWDER PLANT OPERATIONS  
Butter sales
@  58c per pound $ 97,116.47 
Dry milk sales
@  15.05c per pound 49,179.36
TOTAL REVENUE FROM  
PLANT SALES $146,295.83
Cost of raw milk 
39,375 cwt. @  $3.02 
Cost of processing
$118,912.50 
23,034.38
PROCESSING  PLANT 
COSTS $141,946.88
PROFIT FROM PLANT 
OPERATIONS 4,348.95
RETURNS TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS $412,836.45
Table 14. Calculation of member returns for first week of June if 
a strike were called.
Class 1 sales 7,312.5 cwt. @  $3.96 
Class II sales 105,187.5 cwt. @  $3.02
$ 28,957.50 
317,666.25
TOTAL REVENUE FROM  
THE SALE OF M ILK $346,623.75
BUTTER-POWDER PLANT OPERATIONS  
Butter sales
@  58c per pound $215,814.38 
Dry milk sales
@  15.05c per pound 109,287.46
TOTAL REVENUE FROM  
PLANT SALES $325,101.84
Cost of raw milk
87,500 cwt. @  $3.02 $264,250.00 
Cost of processing 36,750.00
PROCESSING  PLANT 
COSTS $301,000.00
PROFIT FROM PLANT 
OPERATIONS 24,101.84
RETURNS TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS $370,725.59
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were followed by a period of falling or low Class I 
volume.
C O N C LU S IO N S
In this study the most important factor affecting a 
cooperative’s bargaining power was the volume of milk 
the cooperative normally supplied to bottlers in rela­
tion to the amount bottlers could obtain from alter­
native sources. O f the markets studied, the two in which 
the cooperatives’ members receive the largest premiums 
are the only two in which bottlers would find it vir­
tually impossible to obtain sufficient milk from other 
sources if cooperatives normally serving these markets 
withheld their milk. For the other markets studied, if 
the local cooperative withheld its milk from the market, 
bottlers could obtain grade A milk from other sources. 
A large cooperative (or a large organization of several 
cooperatives) serving a large market, therefore, has 
greater bargaining power than a smaller organization 
serving a smaller market. Also, a large organization 
serving a large market has more bargaining power than 
several smaller cooperatives serving that same market, 
unless the smaller cooperatives work closely together.
The extent to which two or more dairy cooperatives 
are willing to cooperate with one another in adopting 
mutually beneficial policies can have a significant effect 
on their bargaining ability. By working together to keep 
prices in close alignment and by jointly agreeing not to 
ship milk into another market in which a cooperative 
is attempting to negotiate a higher price by withholding 
milk, each cooperative may be able to negotiate higher 
prices. Thus, the members of all cooperatives may 
benefit.
Adoption of such advantageous strategies, however, 
seems hindered by (a) each cooperative’s fear that 
neighboring cooperatives will not adopt the same strat­
egies, (b) each cooperative’s desire to become larger,
(c) each cooperative’s ignorance of the advantages of 
such cooperation and (d) each cooperative’s felt need 
to serve its own members.
Cooperation among cooperatives can be assured by 
a merger, since each cooperative involved in the merger
loses its previous identity and falls under the same man­
agement. A federation will not necessarily result in the 
cooperation required; nevertheless, it does provide the 
type of atmosphere where cooperatives can become 
more aware o f the merits of cooperation. A merger re­
duces the number of alternative sources of milk to the 
cooperatives’ handlers and thus, contributes to dairy 
farmers’ bargaining power. Through closer coordination 
of the activities of several dairy cooperatives by joint 
bargaining programs or by various oral agreements 
among the cooperatives concerned, a federation at­
tempts to enhance bargaining power.
The willingness o f a dairy bargaining cooperative 
to withhold milk from handlers is greater the smaller 
the percentage of the cooperative’s volume that can be 
replaced from alternative sources and the larger the 
cooperative’s capacity to process milk. Other factors to 
consider before a milk strike is called may include (a) 
the number of handlers from which to withhold milk, 
(b) the characteristics of these handlers, (c) the effect 
of resulting public reaction, if any, (d) whether econom­
ic conditions justify the cooperatives’ demands and (e) 
whether members will back the strike attempt.
A cooperative’s bargaining ability is also affected 
by the number and kind of services it performs for 
bottlers. When a cooperative can perform some services 
for bottlers at a lower cost than the bottler’s cost of 
performing these services for themselves the cooperative 
can bargain for a premium that increases net returns 
to members.
T o maintain membership support and hence milk 
volume, dairy bargaining cooperatives rely on member­
ship meetings, personal contacts with members and the 
provision of various member services in addition to bar­
gaining for the price of milk.
Variation among cooperatives in the importance 
attached to various objectives is due, in part, to differ­
ences in the characteristics of the individual cooperatives 
and of their markets. As market or cooperative char­
acteristics change, the cooperatives’ members and 
boards of directors may wish to change their objectives 
or to change the relative importance of various objec­
tives. This, in turn, may make it desirable to choose dif­
ferent methods of attaining their objectives.
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